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A SOCIAL CONTRACT ARGUMENT FOR
THE STATE'S DUTY TO PROTECT FROM
PRIVATE VIOLENCE
LILIYA ABRAMCHAYEV*

INTRODUCTION

Social contract theory originated with the works of prominent
philosophers, notably, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Locke,
as they explored the origins of a human society and its
characteristics.1 Rousseau argued that in a state of nature, each
man protects his person and property until his own force proves

* To Michael, my constant inspiration.

1 The theory of social contract does not purport to illustrate or document actual
events that led to the formation of a civilized society, but rather is used metaphorically to
describe a historic process of the development of a modern state. See Edward L. Rubin,
Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the Modern State: Keep the Bathwater,
But Throw out that Baby, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 356 (2002).
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to be inadequate against the obstacles to self-preservation. 2 At
this point, it becomes apparent that the joined forces of mankind
will provide greater protection from nature's perils. 3 However, as
people united into society for the purposes of greater safety, they
became confronted with the question of preserving their
liberties. 4 Rousseau reasoned that the balance between safety
and liberty is in the social contract - a universal pact between
members of society to "put into the community his person and all
his powers under the supreme direction of the general will," 5
where every member becomes "an invisible part of the whole." 6
Consequently, the social contract governs the creation of society,
providing for "the mutual protection of the people and their
goods." 7 As members reap the benefits of society and enjoy a
greater degree of protection, they forgo certain freedoms and
comply with the general will of the society, enforced via a formed
government. 8 The union thus formed "marks the transition from

2 See Edward Cheng, Note, A Discussion on Ethical Decisions, 21 J. LEGAL PROF. 89,
94 (1996-1997) (presenting Rousseau's theory on the origins of society); see also April L.
Cherry, Social Contract Theory, Welfare Reform, Race, and the Male Sex-Right, 75 OR. L.
REV. 1037, 1048 (1996) (noting Rousseau's observation that various forms of inequality
amongst individuals fostered the socialization process); Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of
Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1331
(2001) (explaining Rousseau's position that the clash and conflict of individual interests in
a state of nature must be balanced against the general will and common good when
individuals enter into a democratic state).
3 See Cheng, supra note 2, at 93-94 (noting Rousseau's position that man, with the
constant motive of greater protection, can only muster enough power to preserve his
person and goods before finding the need to unite); see also Cherry, supra note 2, at 104849 (discussing Rousseau's belief that social relationships in a state of nature lead to
conflicts that threaten safety and that individuals are forced to unite under a social
contract in order to preserve the social order); Thomas M. Franck, Is Justice Relevant to
the International Legal System?, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 945, 949 (1989) (explaining
Rousseau's belief that the social contract provides for organization, justice, defense of
liberties, and an increase in value for each person involved).
4 See Cheng, supra note 2, at 94 (outlining Rousseau's theory that man submits his
individual power to the general will); Cherry, supra note 2, at 1050-52 (explaining
Rousseau's assertion that men must surrender some natural liberties in a trade off for the
civil liberties he receives as a member of society).
5 JEAN-JACQUES RoussEAu, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 61 (Maurice Cranston trans.,
Penguin Group 1968).
6 Id. at 59.
7 Cheng, supra note 2, at 94.
8 See id. (noting that Rousseau's philosophy of the contract necessarily subordinates
individual desires when they are in conflict with the general will); Franck, supra note 3,
at 949 (asserting that Rousseau's concept of the social contract calls for an alienation of
individual rights to the community); Rosenfeld, supra note 2, at 1332 (explaining that
Rousseau conceived of a society in where the general will is produced from the opposition
of individual interests).
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state of the nature to civil state." 9 The idea of social contract
encompasses the notion that individuals forming it are free and
equal,' 0 and when they subject themselves to its rule, they follow
their own rules.11
Locke agreed with Rousseau,12 arguing that the main reason
people form societies and subject themselves to a government is
for "preservation of their property" and safety.13 The government
formed thus serves the purpose of protecting the individuals. In
addition, Locke further emphasized that formation of the
government, by the people joining into the contract, is governed
by public good and with the consent of the individuals agreeing to
be governed.1 4 Indeed, the doctrine postulates that since the
individuals participate in the rule-making process, all its rules
9 THE SOCIAL CONTRACT FROM HOBBES TO RAWLS 37 (David Boucher & Paul Kelly
eds., Routelidge 1994).
10 Id.
11 See Cheng, supra note 2, at 94. Cheng explains that Rousseau's theory of social
contract posits that the individual must submit to the greater society to which he is a
part. Id. This includes subordinating individual desires the law of the general will when
the two come in conflict. Id. at 94. Rosenfeld, supra note 2, at 1332-33. In discussing
Rousseau's social theory, Rosenfeld states "law is legitimate if it is an expression of the
general will that emerges as a consequence of a dynamic process and accounts for all
relevant interests." Id. at 1332. According to Rousseau, this is the foundation of
legitimacy. Ingeborg Maus, Liberties and Popular Sovereignty: On Jurgen Habermas's
Reconstruction of the System of Rights, 17 CARDOzO L. REV. 825, 827 (1996). Maus
comments that Rousseau's commitment to a democratic system of law that provides for
equal application, equal protection, and the elimination of preferential treatment. Id. at
827.
12 John Locke says:
Men being.., by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of his
estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent. The
only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty and puts on the
bonds of civil society is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a
community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a
secure enjoinment of their properties and a greater security against any that are not
of it.
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 54 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., The
Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1690); see Rosenfeld, supra note 2, at 1311. Locke and Rousseau
are among the founders of social contract theory where the legitimacy of government is
established by the consent of the governed. Id. at 1311. FROST, supra note 1, at 199. Frost
identifies Locke and Rousseau as thinkers who propose that man's true nature can only
be realized in some form of social organization. Id. Although differing in their details,
both agree that the social group and government gain their legitimacy through the
consent of everyone involved. Id.
13 See Douglas G. Smith, A Lockean Analysis of Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1095, 1150 (2002).
14 See Donald L. Doernberg, "We the People John Locke, Collective Constitutional
Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 52, 59 (1985);
Randolph J. May, Independent Judicial Review: An Appreciation of its Origins and Some
Contemporary Musings About its Role Two Hundred Years Later, 2 GEO. MASON IND. L.
REV. 195, 197 (1993).
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are just and legitimate. 15 The justness and legitimacy of the rules
are secured by the relationship formed between the government
and its citizens, which Locke characterized as one of trust. Trust
gives rise to the fiduciary power "to be exercised solely for the
good of the community."16 The fiduciary relationship creates a
wide array of powers for the government,' 7 but it is subject to an
obligation: protection of the rights of the individuals who had
given the government the power to act.1 8 Locke further argued
and proposed that when a government violates this agreement,
i.e. enacts a rule that goes against "preservation of property" and
"protection of safety," the citizens reserve the right to dissolve
the government and create a new one that would protect their
rights and guard their safety.' 9 Another influential philosopher,
Charles Montesquieu, recognized yielding of individual rights at
the formation of a government and therefore saw the protection
of these rights as a governmental responsibility. 20
The writings of these Enlightenment philosophers were so
influential that newly established governments used the political
theory of the social contract as the basis for their governmental
forms. 21 The most profound influence was on the young American
Republic as it declared its independence from Britain. Lockean
concepts of rights and liberties are found throughout the
Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights, as the Framers
15
16

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT FROM HOBBES TO RAWLS, supra note 9, at 38.
THOMAS P. PEARDON, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE, SECOND

TREATISE

OF

GOVERNMENT xv (Thomas P. Peardon ed., The Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1690).
17 Id.
18 See PEARDON, supra note 16, at xvii.

19 See Cheng, supra note 2, at 95.
20 May, supra note 14, at 198. See David P. Currie, Positive and Negative
ConstitutionalRights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 867 (1986).
As early as 1758, Montesquieu had argued that the state 'owed all
citizens,' among other things, 'nourishment, suitable clothing, and the opportunity for
a healthy life. The French Constitution of 1791 acknowledged such a duty by imposing
an obligation on government to establish not only a system of free public education
but also a system of public assistance 'to bring up abandoned children, relieve poor
invalids, and furnish work to the able-bodied poor who cannot obtain it for
themselves.
Id. at 867. See generally HILARY BOK, Baron de Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat,
THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY §§ 4.1, 4.2 (Edward N. Zalta, ed., 2003)

available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2O03/entries/montesquieu (last visited
Mar. 28, 2004).
21 See David R. Papke, A Democracy for the Pursuit of Happiness, 35 IND. L. REV.
1005, 1007 (2002) (reviewing JOHN DENVIR, DEMOCRACY'S CONSTITUTION: CLAIMING THE
PRIVILEGES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2001)).
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searched for the assurance of the American freedom. 22 In fact,
such powerful proclamations as "We the People," "Life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness," and "We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal," which are so central
to the American Constitution, are attributable to the works of
John Locke. 2 3 The social contract, the key element of Locke's
work, laid the foundation for the newly created Constitution and
the government it formed. 24 By covenanting to obey the laws of
the society, the central feature of the social contract is that "one
is entitled to preservation of his life, and property." 25 The basis
for such entitlement is that "these rights belong to all individuals
because they are human beings." 26 The function of preservation
of life, and property goes to the government, as it limits and
regulates people's freedoms for the general good, and the scope of
governmental duty of preservation is limited to these "natural
rights" of life, liberty and property, which are inalienable, i.e. not
forfeited at the formation of the society. 27 However, as
individuals abide by the laws of society, the society restricts the
ways individuals can enforce their rights, i.e., the individuals
surrender to the state the authority to enforce their rights. 2 8 For
example, when an individual has been deprived of his life or
property, neither he, nor his family can go after the perpetrator
to enforce his deprived rights. His only recourse is that state
laws allow for vindication and that the state will pursue the
application of these laws to the perpetrator. Therefore, the
individual's natural rights create a duty on the government to

22 See David L. Wardle, Reason to Ratify: The Influence of John Locke's Religious
Beliefs on the Creationand Adoption of the United States Constitution, 26 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 291, 297 (2002).
23 See id. at 297-98. "Locke's ideas influenced the creation and adoption of the
Constitution in three specific ways: they inspired the founding fathers to undertake the
creation of a new government; they formed the foundation of the document; and they
encouraged public ratification of the Constitution."
24 See Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REV.
1, 34 (1999) ("Formation of American government [was portrayed] as a social contract.");
Wardle, supra note 22, at 302 (establishing that "the framers of the Constitution felt that
a social contract is the basis of free government").
25 Wardle, supra note 22, at 306.
26 Prudence E. Taylor, From Environmental to Ecological Human Rights: A New
Dynamic in InternationalLaw?, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 312 (1998).
27 See PEARDON, supra note 16, at xiii-xviii.
28 See Taylor, supra note 26, at 312.
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protect and enforce these rights. 29 The Framers understood that
proposition as the core purpose of the new government and
intended the Constitution to guarantee the protection of these
rights. 30 In fact, in the Declaration of Independence, after
outlining the inalienable rights, the drafters defined the purpose
31
of the legitimate government as "secur[ing] these [r]ights."
Consequently, the Constitution is also a "manifestation of the
social contract whose continued viability and authority
ultimately depends on... [the] phenomenon like the inalienable
rights of human beings" 32 and governmental correlational
obligation to secure these rights. 33
The Supreme Court endorsed the idea of the social contract
and had stated that "[t]he people... erected their Constitutions,
or forms of government... to protect their persons from violence.

The purposes for which men enter into society will determine the
nature and the terms of the social compact." 3 4 On another
occasion, the Court affirmed its position with respect to the
state's purpose and duty to protect its citizens, noting that "[t]he
obligation of the government to protect life, liberty and property
against the conduct of the indifferent, the careless and the evilminded may be regarded as laying at the very foundation of the

29 See A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 72-73 (Princeton
University Press 1992) (illustrating the point via example: children have a right to be
cared for, that right creates a duty on the parents to provide such care); see also Jennifer
J. Dacey, Citizens Fourth Amendment Rights: Do They Extend Only to the Waters' Edge?
United States v. Barona, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 761, 764 (1997) (referring to the
arrangement as one of "correlative rights and responsibilities").
30 See Thomas B. McAffee, Inalienable Rights, Legal Enforceability, and American
Constitutions: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Concept of Unenumerated Rights, 36
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 747, 747-49 (2001); Thomas B. McAffee, The Constitution as Based
on the Consent of the Governed-or, Should We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 80 OR.
L. REV. 1245, 1250 (2001); Lee J. Strang, Originalism and Legitimacy, 11 KAN. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 657, 670 (2002) (quoting RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 16 (1985)) ("The Lockean system was dominant at the
time when the Constitution was adopted.").
31 Kimberly C. Shankman & Roger Pilon, Reviving the Privileges and Immunities
Clause to Redress the Balance among States, Individuals, and the Federal Government, 3
TEX. REV. L. & POL'Y 1, 14 (1998).
32 Kirk A. Kennedy, Reaffirming the Natural Law Jurisprudenceof Justice Clarence
Thomas, 9 REGENT U. L. REV. 33, 47 (1997).
33 See Dacey, supra note 29, at 764. "[1]mplicit, then, in the Framers' understanding
of the Constitution as a compact was the notion that correlative rights and
responsibilities would govern relations between the people and their government."
34 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798); see also Robert Deichert, Note, Honoring
the Social Compact: Arguing for a State Duty of Protection Under the Connecticut
Constitution,33 CONN L. REV. 1069 1094-95 (2001).
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social compact." 3 5 In more recent cases, the Court held that the
social contract governed the interpretation of the Constitution's
37
Establishment Clause 36 and the Ex Post Facto Laws Clause,

among others.
The thrust of the social contract is concentrated in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 3 8 and 42 U.S.C. §
1983, which allows private causes of action for governmental
wrongs. 3 9 Following the narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment in the Slaughter House Cases,40 the Supreme Court
has defined the Constitution as a "charter of negative rights,"
meaning that the Constitution requires the government to
refrain from acting, as opposed to positive rights, which would
protection. 4 1 This
entitle
individuals
to governmental
interpretation of the Constitution is not only inconsistent with
the theory of the social contract, but also with the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 42 resulting in such decisions as denial of
funding of abortions to poor women, 4 3 denial of protections to
35 City of Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313, 322 (1911).
36 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 606 (1992). "The Establishment Clause protects
religious liberty on a grand scale; it is a social compact that guarantees for generations a
democracy and a strong religious community-both essential to safeguarding religious
liberty."
37 See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 521 (2000).
38 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating ".. .nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...").
39 Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered
to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
40 83 U.S. 36, 78 (1872).
41 See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a
Negative Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 410 (1990) (arguing that
reluctance to enforce fundamental rights against state and private action reinforces a
view that the Constitution primarily provides negative rights); see also Bryan R. Berry,
Crime of Dispassion: Eighth Circuit (Mis)Applies DeShaney in Failing to Hold State
Employees Accountable to the Children They Protect: S.S. ex rel. Jervis v. McMullen, 66
Mo. L. REV. 881, 886-87 (2001) (describing Supreme Court approaches to Fourteenth
Amendment cases under the "charter of negative liberties" theory).
42 See discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment infra notes 38-46 (delineating the
history of the Fourteenth Amendment).
43 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980).
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state government workers from hazardous work conditions,44 and
denial of protection to individuals from violent acts of others. 45
The defining case in the area of substantive due process violation
and § 1983 liability is DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services.46
I. DESHANEY V. WINNEBAGO COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL SERVICES 47

In 1980 a Wyoming court granted custody over one-year old
Joshua DeShaney to his father, Randy DeShaney, after a divorce
between his parents. 48 Joshua and his father then moved to
Wisconsin, where in 1982, Randy DeShaney's former second wife
informed the police that Joshua might be a victim of child abuse,
stating Joshua's father "hit the boy causing marks and [was] a
prime case for child abuse." 49 The Winnebago County
Department of Social Services (DSS) interviewed Randy
DeShaney, but he denied all accusations.
DSS did not
investigate further and closed the file. One year later, in 1983,
Joshua was treated in a hospital for multiple bruises and
abrasions. The examining doctor notified DSS, which in turn
obtained an order from a juvenile court to place Joshua in the
temporary custody of the hospital. 5 0 In a couple of days, the
County assembled a "Child Protection Team" consisting of
professionals from various fields, including a pediatrician, a
psychologist, a police detective, lawyers, and social workers.51
Assessing Joshua's situation, the Team concluded there was
insufficient evidence of child abuse and decided to return custody
of Joshua to his father.5 2 However, the Team recommended that
DSS take some protective measures, including enrollment of
Joshua in a preschool program, providing his father with
44 See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992).
45 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 298 (1987),
affm'd, 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (stating that the Due Process Clause is a limitation on
state action and does not guarantee minimal levels of safety and security).
46 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
47

Id. at 189.

48 Id. at 191.
49 Id. at 192 (quoting Appellate Brief 152-53).
50 Id.

51 Id.
52

Id.
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counseling services, and moving his father's girlfriend out of the
house. 53 Randy DeShaney voluntarily agreed to cooperate with
DSS in accomplishing these goals54 and signed a written
document outlining his responsibilities. 55 Based on the Team's
finding of insufficient evidence of child abuse and the agreement
to protect Joshua, the juvenile court returned the child to the
custody of his father. 56 A month later, emergency room personnel
notified DSS that Joshua once again was treated for suspicious
injuries. 5 7 The social worker handling the case concluded that
there was no basis for DSS to take action.5 8 Following this
incident, for the next six months, the social worker made
monthly visits to the DeShaney home, during which she observed
several suspicious injuries, including some on Joshua's head.59
She also noticed that Joshua was not enrolled in school and that
the father's girlfriend had not moved out. 60 The caseworker
diligently recorded her observations in the file, along with her
suspicions that Joshua was indeed physically abused, 6 1 but did
nothing else. 6 2 In November of 1983, the hospital staff once more
treated Joshua for injuries believed to be caused by child abuse. 63
DSS was again notified.64 On her next two visits to the
DeShaney's home, the social worker was not allowed to see
Joshua. 65 Even after these events, DSS did not take measures to
protect the child.66 In March 1984, severe beatings put Joshua in
a life-threatening coma. 6 7 Emergency brain surgery revealed
8
series of hemorrhages caused by consistent injuries to his head.6
Joshua lost almost half of the tissue in his brain. 6 9 However,
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 192-93.
Id. at 193.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Joshua did not die.70 Instead, he will spend the rest of his life in
the institution for the profoundly retarded as a result of the
7
severe brain damage caused by systematic abuse. 1
Joshua and his mother brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the Winnebago County Department of Social Services,
alleging a deprivation of liberty without due process of law under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 72 The complaint alleged that DSS
knew or should have known of the risk of violence to Joshua and
violated Joshua's rights by failing to intervene to protect him
from such violence. 7 3 The District Court granted summary
judgment for the defendants and Judge Posner of Seventh Circuit
affirmed. 7 4 Upon grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court observed
"the importance of the issue to the administration of state and
local governments," 7 5 and in doing so, affirmed the Seventh
Circuit decision. 76
In analyzing Joshua's claim alleging DSS' violation of Due
Process under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that
"nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself
requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its
citizens against invasion by private actors."77 Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist interpreted the Clause as a
constitutional limitation on the state's power to take action, "not
78
as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security."
In doing so, the Court acknowledged that the Clause carries the
dual purposes of safeguarding procedural and substantive due
process and that Joshua's claim involved a substantive
component. 79 The Court equated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to that of the Fifth Amendment, and
held that both of them were intended "to prevent government
70
71
72
73

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
74 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 298), affm'd, 489
U.S. 189.
75 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 194.
76 Id. at 201. "The State does not become the permanent guarantor of an individual's
safety by having once offered him shelter. Under these circumstances, the State had no
constitutional duty to protect Joshua."
77 Id. at 195.

78 Id.
79 Id.
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from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument of
oppression." 8 0 The Chief Justice found support for such reading
of the Fourteenth Amendment in that "[t]he Framers were
content to leave the extent of governmental obligation [of the
protection of its citizens] to the democratic political processes." 8 1
Laying such a foundation, the Court then proceeded to hold that
the Constitution, and particularly the Fourteenth Amendment,
does not require the states to provide any protective services to
its citizens. Consequently, the state cannot be liable for failing to
provide that protection,8 2 even if it had been completely within
its ability and authority to do so.
Joshua and his mother further argued that since DSS knew of
the grave danger Joshua was in and had already undertaken
action to protect Joshua from it, the state had acquired an
affirmative duty to shield him from such danger.83 Failure to
carry out this duty "was an abuse of governmental power that so
shocks the conscience." 84 In analyzing this argument, the Court
focused its attention on two prior cases: 85 Estelle v. Gamble8 6 and
Youngberg v. Romeo. 8 7 In both of these cases a constitutionally
required state's duty of care of protection was recognized. 88
Estelle involved a prisoner's claim to adequate medical care to
which he was held entitled after a showing of deliberate
indifference on the part of prison officials.8 9 The Court "reasoned
80 Id. at 196 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)). The Due Process
Clause of the 5th Amendment reads: no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V, §1, cl. 3. The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: ". . nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
81 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196.
82 See id. at 196-97; Kay P. Kindred, Of Child Welfare and Welfare Reform: The
Implications For Children When Contradictory Policies Collide, 9 WM. & MARY J. OF
WOMEN & L. 413, 469 (2003) ("Indeed, the state could choose not to provide any child
protection services at all.").
83 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197; Susan Vivian Mangold, Reforming Child Protection In
Response to the Catholic Church Child Sexual Abuse Scandal, 14 J. LAW. & PUB. POL'Y
155, 171 (2003) (insisting that there is a balance of responsibility in instances of child
abuse between the State, the parent, and the child).
84 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197.
85 Id. at 198-99.
86 429 U.S. 97 (1982).
87 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
88 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198; 429 U.S. at 103-04; 457 U.S. at 314-25.
89 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199 n.5 (noting that "the mere negligent or inadvertent
failure to provide adequate care is not enough."); 429 U.S. at 105-06 (stating ("[riegardess
of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury states a
cause of action under § 1983.").
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that because the prisoner is unable by reason of the deprivation
of his liberty to care for himself, it is only just that the State be
required to care for him."9 0 Similarly, in Youngberg, an
involuntarily admitted mental patient was entitled to
"reasonabl[y] safe" conditions provided by the state. 9 1
Considering the holdings in these cases, the Court derived a
"proposition that when the State takes a person into its custody
and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes
upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for
his safety and general well-being." 92 In further advancing its
position, the Court explained:
The rationale for this principle is simple enough: when the
State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an
individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for
himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic
human needs.

.

. -it

transgresses the substantive limits on

state action set by the [Constitution].93
In applying this principle to the facts of DeShaney, the Court
noted that since the state did not restrain Joshua's liberty, and
did not place him in a position of danger, it "had no constitutional
duty to protect Joshua." 94 For the majority, the disposition of the
case turned on this state's "inaction."
Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, which was joined by
Justices Blackmun and Marshall, criticized the Court's view of
the state's role as "inactive."9 5 He argued that attention should
have been focused on what the State has done. 9 6 Looking at the
record from that perspective, it becomes apparent that Wisconsin
created a Department of Social Services for the very reason of
providing protection to children like Joshua. Protection includes
investigation of cases of suspected child abuse, prevention, and
action to protect the children. 9 7 Moreover, the Department had
90 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199 (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C.
1926)).
91 Id. at 200; Youngberg v.Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (ruling that the State has
"the unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety for all residents and personnel within
the institution.").
92 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199.
93 Id. at 200.
94 Id. at 201.
95 Id. at 203.
96 Id. at 205.
97 Id. at 209.
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the exclusive authority to provide protection to these children by
successfully cutting off other sources of help by requiring cases of
child abuse to be referred to the Department for ultimate
decision. 98 For Justice Brennan, "[i]t simply belies reality.. .to
contend that the State stood by and did nothing with respect to
Joshua."9 9

Furthermore, Justice Brennan challenged the Court's
characterization of custody as physical for the purposes of
establishing duty, suggesting that the State itself must render
the individual unable to care for himself.1 0 0 Yet, in Romeo, the
plaintiff, a mental patient, had an IQ of between 8 and 10 and
was functioning at the level of an 18-month old child.101 It was
certainly not the state that rendered him unable to care for
himself, yet the state was found to owe him a duty to provide
reasonable safety.102 For Justice Brennan, "the State's
knowledge of an individual's predicament and its expressions of
intent to help him can amount to a limitation on his freedom to
act on his own behalf or to obtain help from others," 103 and
therefore trigger the recognition of a duty.
In addition, Justice Brennan raised an issue of arbitrary
discrimination or indifference on the part of the DSS that
resulted in failure to come to aid to Joshua. 104 Such arbitrariness
amounts to an abuse of power and is violative of the Due Process
Clause.105
Justice Blackmun's dissent focused on majority's formalistic
approach and its detachment from any sense of justice. 106 He
argued that the true guide for deciding the case should be moral
ambition,107 justice, and compassion.OS
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 206.
101 Id.

102 Id.
103 Id. at 207.
104 Id. at 210.
105 Id. at 211; see Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (stating that purpose
of Due Process Clause is to protect individuals from arbitrary government actions).
106 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's
view of Fourteenth Amendment as too rigid: "Faced with the choice, I would adopt a
sympathetic reading, one which comports with dictates of fundamental justice and
recognizes that compassion need not be exiled from the province of judging.").
107 Id. (quoting A. STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY 262 (1984)) (recognizing
that mistakes in judgment may be made but that "moral ambition" requires them to act
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II. ANALYSIS
A. The Social Contract
"The very end and function of government [is] to preserve an
individual's natural rights."109 This statement is the core of the
social contract doctrine, which is in turn the foundation for our
Constitution. 110 Applying the social contract doctrine to the
context of DeShaney, it becomes apparent that DSS not only
owed Joshua a duty of protection from abuse DSS knew Joshua
was suffering, but also that DSS impermissibly breached it. The
legislature of Wisconsin, elected by the majority of people,
decided to implement DSS,111 whose function would be to
investigate cases of child abuse and protect children from it. By
doing so, the state acknowledged its duty toward its citizens,
especially toward the vulnerable class: the children. Indeed,
creation of DSS was a recognition of children's entitlements to
such protection, and this entitlement called for such state
action.11

2

When DSS received evidence of Joshua's plight, it was under
affirmative obligation to take steps necessary to ensure his
safety.11 3 In failing to do so, DSS undoubtedly breached that
where it is apparently needed); see William Jefferson Clinton, Tribute: The Steady Hand
of Justice Blackmun, 104 YALE. L. J. 1, 2 (1994) (marking this definition of Fourteenth
Amendment requiring "moral ambition" as part of legacy of Justice Blackmun).
108 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
109 GARY C. LEEDES, THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 36 (1986) (quoting JOHN
LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1690)).
110 See id.
111 See WIS. STAT. § 48.981 (2003). Wisconsin law provides for the protection of
children and investigative processes ensuring such protection. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 208
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Even if the state had not created DSS, the citizens have the
right to demand and expect protection from private violence. See Robin West, The
Constitutionand the Obligationsof Government to Secure the Material Preconditionsfor a
Good Society: Rights, Capabilitiesand the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 190910 (2001).
112 See West, supra note 111, at 1908:
Rights could be defined as the individual entitlements that follow from what states
are morally required to do and what liberal states are morally prohibited from
doing.... [Elvery individual must be accorded equal dignity, equal concern, and
equal respect. To accord all individuals dignity, concern, and respect, sometimes
requires the state to refrain from acting, and sometimes requires it to act.
Id. WIS. STAT. § 48.981(3). This statute outlines the specific duties of DSS. DeShaney, 489
U.S. at 208 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court in DeShaney also reviewed some of these
duties and policy reasons for them.
113 See WIS. STAT. § 48.981(3); DeShaney, 489 U.S. 189, at 203-12 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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obligation. The Court characterized this as mere "inaction"
amounting to common law tort, not rising to the level of
constitutional violation.1 1 4 But it was the Court itself that
reduced this constitutional claim to a common law tort by
employing the state inaction analysis,1 15 giving rise to a duty
only when the state "affirmatively" exercises its power. The
distinction between action and inaction often is blurred, and in
fact, there is no such thing as state inaction. To begin with, the
state facilitates the creation of family and places an affirmative
duty of care on the parents to nurture their children. By
exercising its powers, the state placed Joshua in the custody of
his father. Furthermore, the state created DSS and gave it the
exclusive power to interfere with children's lives.1l 6 These are
specific examples of the notion that state action is everywhere,
17
contributing to the conditions individuals find themselves.1
State action is pervasive and its traces can be found in the
background of any situation.l1 8
By employing the state inaction analysis, the Court carves out
an exception where a state acquires a duty of protection once it

restrains an individual's liberty as to render him unable to care
for himself. This principle was partly based on Youngberg case,
but as Justice Brennan correctly points out, the plaintiff there, a
mental patient, had not been able to care for himself long before
the state assumed custody over him.'1 9 Similarly here, it is
114 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201-02.
115 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201-02 (holding that there was no constitutional
violation and that the state's inaction merely amounted to common law tort); David A.
Strauss, Due Process, Government Inaction, and Private Wrongs, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 53,
54 (1989) (noting that aside from misfeasance, under common law, a duty may arise from
a status of the individual placed in the position of offering help); G. Kristian Miccio, Notes
from the Underground:Battered Women, the State, and Conceptions of Accountability, 23
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 133, 143 (2000) ("Status of the individual, coupled with professional
expertise forms a predicate for responsibility." Therefore, at common law, a person with
status, i.e. a state official owes a duty toward the citizens arising out of his or her "public
calling or office.").
116 See WIS. STAT. § 48.981(3) (2003).
117 See Strauss, supra note 115, at 67 (arguing the state restricted Joshua's liberty by
failing to protect him); Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A
Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1992)
(claiming state's inaction here amounted to breach of affirmative duty).
118 I do not mean to suggest that any private action is equal to state action, but
merely suggest that any private action is performed and shaped by the state action in the
background. See Strauss, supra note 115, at 67. This can also be seen in private actions
for spousal abuse, as actions are not just private but have a public face too. Id.
119 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 206 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307, 309-10.
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apparent that Joshua, as well as children in general, are unable
to provide for their needs and protect themselves, and the states
acknowledge this by requiring parents to do so. 12 0 But by
refusing to come to Joshua's aid,121 DSS abused its power;
moreover, it did it in an arbitrary way.122 To frame it within the
Court's analysis, abuse of power can also be state action,
triggering liability.
In addition, the Court overlooked the point that Joshua's
restraint was unnecessary for finding a duty: the state had
already placed him in the custody of an abusive father.12 3
Concededly, the state did not know of the father's abusive
tendencies the first time it granted custody, but it certainly had
enough information to alert itself the second time when the state
made an informed decision to place a child in the hands of an
abusive parent.124 In doing so, the state "put Joshua in a position
of danger from a private person ...

and cut off his sources of

private aid."12 5 Following the logic of the "exception," "the state
owed Joshua a duty of care against private violence from his
father." 12 6 Moreover, in citing the Gamble case for its support of
the custody exception, the Court stated, "it is only just that the
State be required to care for him."127 Would it not also be just for
Joshua to receive protection from the state that returned him to
the custody of the abusive father, especially since the state
agency, DSS, had the exclusive power to offer such protection?
In justifying this holding, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed
concern as to governmental intrusion into the parent-child
120 In fact, the state not only prosecutes the perpetrators who abuse children, but
those who failed to protect them, like the witnessing mothers who are unable to shield
their children from violent fathers. See Miccio, supranote 115, at 133.
121 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 206, (noting it is difficult to characterize DSS' conduct
otherwise; Carolina D. Watts, Indifferent [Towards] Indifference: Post-DeShaney
Accountability for Social Services Agencies When a Child is Injured or Killed Under Their
Protective Watch, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 125, 153 (2002) (asserting victim child in DeShaney
was failed by his father, child welfare system, and the court).
122 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 210, (Brennan, J. (dissenting)); Strauss, supra note 115, at
79 (maintaining that "government officials can abuse their power by wrongfully
withholding government services or protection").
123 See Strauss, supra note 115, at 68 ("All members of society- not just state
prisoners, involuntarily committed patients, and foster children- owe their position in
some measure to the actions of the government.").
124 It can be argued in accord with the Court's analysis, that this very act was the
state action, triggering the obligation to provide protection.
125 Strauss, supra note 115, at 65 (internal symbols omitted).
126 Id.
127 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199 (internal quotations omitted).
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relationship if the state moves too quickly to remove the child
from the family.128 Effectively, the DeShaney holding, by
removing liability from the state conduct, gives the state officials
"too little incentive to provide adequate protection."129 The
appropriate solution seems to lie in a carefully designed system
of immunities and giving proper deference to the professional
judgment. 130 However, in no way should state officials be allowed
"to [stand] by and [do] nothing when suspicious circumstances
dictate a more active role for them."131
There is also a danger of a so-called "parade of horribles" that
might overwhelm the courts if the state is held liable for failing
to prevent some harm. But the liability should be limited to
cases where the state officials know of the danger, have means to
protect from it, but fail to do so. In fact, in the cases like
DeShaney, it is hard not to find liability.132 The opinion has been
criticized for its failure to impose a liability on the basis of
erroneous interpretation of the Constitution,133 "intellectual and
historical dishonesty,"134 and mechanistic approach to a
paramount social problem.13 5
B. The FourteenthAmendment
The foundation for the majority's holding was the proposition
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does
not impose on a state any affirmative duties to protect
individuals.13 6 The Clause reads: ".. .nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law."13 7 There are many ways to read the word "deprive," and the
Court suggests that "deprivation" must be an affirmative
128 Id. at 203; see Strauss, supra note 115, at 80 n.63.
129 Strauss, supra note 115, at 80 n.63.
130 See id.
131 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203.
132 See Deichert, supra note 34, at 1069-70.
133 See id.
134 Miccio, supra note 115, at 125.
135 Id. at 168 (referring to decision as "dreadful public policy"); see Susan Bandes, The
Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2287 (1990) (proclaiming
DeShaney opinion to be "classic example of conventional, conceptualist approach").
136 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18
(1980) (holding that while Due Process Clause imposes limitations on government actors,
it does not mandate affirmative obligation to provide necessary services to its citizens).
137 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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action;' 38 however, it is not unreasonable to attach other
meanings to it. i 39 If the government cannot deprive, then must it
provide?
Stay neutral? Analysis of this sort must be in
conjunction with consideration of the purpose of government. If
we pause and think about what is the purpose of government, the
ubiquitous answers come to mind: to ensure and provide for
order, stability, and prosperity. The state is actively engaged in
achieving and maintaining these objectives.
Meeting these
objectives necessarily implies a duty to offer protection, and in
large part, the government has been able to offer protection, as
manifested in creating such entities as police. It is difficult to
imagine that a police officer would be relieved of liability if he
had witnessed a crime, had the ability to prevent it, yet "stood
by" and did nothing in the same fashion as DSS. For example, in
Anderson v. Branen,i40 the court held that it "is widely
recognized that all law enforcement officials have an affirmative
duty to intervene to protect the constitutional rights of citizens
from infringement by other law enforcement officers in their
presence."141 However, since this duty to offer protection is
implied in the very purpose of the government, it tends to escape
enforcement, and failure to carry out the duty is viewed as "state
inaction," not a due process violation. A quick look at history
clarifies the picture to the point where the state's duty to protect
is unambiguously rooted in the Constitution.
The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted in light of clear
governmental inaction of the states that refused to offer
protection to the newly freed black citizens, who were often the
victims of violence. 42 The clear intent of the federal government
was to compel the southern states to enforce the natural rightsi 4 3
138 See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (noting that deprivation clause
of Fourteenth Amendment refers to "deliberate" decisions of government). See generally
Katherine R. Urbonya, Establishing a Deprivation of a ConstitutionalRight to Personal
Security Under Section 1983: The Use of Unjustified Force by State Officials in Violation
of the Fourth, Eighth and FourteenthAmendments, 51 ALB. L. REV. 173, 193-99 (1987).
139 See Steven J. Heyman, Constitutional Perspectives: Article: The First Duty of
Government: Protection,Liberty and the FourteenthAmendment, 1991 DUKE L.J. 507, 562
(1991); Miccio, supra note 115, at 166 (suggesting that historical background of Due
Process clause supports conclusion that "deprive" can be read to mean "fail to protect").
140 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994).
141 Id. at 557.
142 See Heyman, supra note 139, at 509.
143 Later these rights came to be known as "civil rights." See Allen, supra note 24, at
35-36.
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of black individuals.1 44 The role of the state was not to merely
recognize negative rights but positively protect them, and it was
viewed as "the most fundamental obligation the government
owed to its citizens."14 5 In furthering its goal, the federal
government drafted the Fourteenth Amendment and used the
Due Process Clause as a tool of ensuring its applicability to the
states, obliging them to protect the rights appearing in the
Clause.14 6 Although the Drafters borrowed some language of the
Clause from the Fifth Amendment, their clear intent was not to
place limitations on the government's ability to act, but rather to
47
expand states' obligations to offer protection to their citizens.1
Therefore, it follows that "a central purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment... was to establish the right to protection as a part
of the federal Constitution and laws, and thus to require the
states to protect the fundamental rights of all persons. .. "148,
49
including protection from private violence.1
Despite such clear manifestation of the purpose of the
amendment and the Due Process Clause, Chief Justice Rehnquist
reads it as "a limitation on the state's power to act, not as
guarantee of certain minimal levels of protection and security."150
Such an interpretation not only defeats the whole notion that a
basic purpose of the government is to protect its citizens, as
evidenced in the adoption of the social contract as the basis for
the Constitution, but also damages the specific objective of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Chief Justice purported to follow
144 Heyman, supra note 139, at 509. "Unrestrained violence against the Blacks and
states' failure to protect them prompted the federal government to provide "federal
guarantees of protection.. .through constitutional amendment." Id. at 550.
145 Heyman, supra note 139, at 511-12.
146 See Gerhardt, supra note 41, at 427 (stating dual purposes of Fourteenth
Amendment, including constitutional, as opposed to state, protection of rights of all
American citizens); Heyman, supra note 139, at 532-34 (describing recognition of
substantive rights as component of "protection"); Miccio, supra note 115, at 166 (arguing
that Fourteenth Amendment reconfigured state's duty from merely restricting states from
invading constitutional rights to positive protection of those rights from invasion by
private actors).
147 Heyman, supra note 139, at 562:
The contemporary understanding of the due process clause was not limited to direct
governmental takings of life, liberty, and property. Instead, that clause was
understood in the antebellum legal tradition to guarantee these rights the protection
of the laws ...[T]his understanding was shared by the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
148 Heyman, supra note 139, at 546.
149 Id.

150 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195.
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the intent of the Drafters when he stated, "Framers were content
to leave the extent of governmental obligation... to the
democratic political processes."151 However, not only is the Chief
Justice mistaken about the goals of the Drafters, but he also
endorses the views of their critics. 152 Nevertheless, DeShaney
remains the controlling case in the area of governmental inaction
and has had an enormous effect on subsequent litigation.153
III. POST-DESHANEY JURISPRUDENCE
Just as the state's presence is immersed in every individual's
situation, so is state action as it permeates every level of society.
The government, in discharge of its duties mandated by the
social contract, has created various institutions for the benefits of
its citizens, the most apparent being schools and police. Since
these institutions are governmental entities, the DeShaney
holding has been applied to them in the various situations where
individual's well-being depends on how the government uses its
power, and when the government misuses its power, the
DeShaney holding shields it from liability.15 4 The following
provides an overview of the cases where courts analyze the
DeShaney holding in the public school, domestic violence, and
police settings.
In Stevens v. Umsted,155 a disabled student in a state
residential school brought a § 1983 action alleging that school
officials failed to protect him from sexual abuse by other students
even after the school officials gained actual knowledge of the
assaults on the student.156 Following DeShaney, the court found
no constitutional violation because the plaintiff voluntarily

151 Id. at 196.
152 See Gerhardt, supra note 41, at 422-38 (criticizing Chief Justice Rehnquist's and
Judge Posner's approach for their inconsistency with the history and purpose of
Fourteenth Amendment and for their endorsement of opponents' of amendment's views);
see also Jack M. Beermann, Administrative Failure and Local Democracy: The Politics of
DeShaney, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1078, 1088-90 (1990) (critiquing DeShaney's Court's
characterization of the Framers' intent).
153 See generally Beermann, supra note 152, at 1087-1112.
154 See, e.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 308 F.3d 768, 770-76 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that
state officials did not violate duty to foster children when they were abused by foster
parents).
155 131 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 1997).
156 Id. at 699.
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attended the school.1 57 The Seventh Circuit based its holding on
DeShaney's language that "when the State takes a person into its
custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution
imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some
responsibility for his safety and general well-being."158 The
Seventh Circuit overlooked the fact that the Supreme Court
derived this proposition only after reviewing its holdings in
Estelle and Youngberg; therefore, the Seventh Circuit was free to
find functional custody in the fact that the student was disabled,
lived in the school, and was completely dependent on its officials
for his protection.159 Instead, the court emphasized that the
plaintiff attended the school voluntarily and could have
requested a discharge at any time without taking into account
state compulsory education laws, the student's disability, and the
uniqueness of a residential school to meet disabled students'
educational demands.160
In D.R. ex rel. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical
School,161 the complaint involved allegations of repeated physical
and sexual abuse of a disabled student by other students in a
public school.16 2 The abusive conduct took place in the art room
in the locking unisex bathroom and a darkroom.1 6 3 The class
teacher allegedly was or should have been present in the
classroom and admitted to being unable to control the class. The
plaintiff was subsequently subject to a variety of misconduct by
the students, including offensive touching. 164 The plaintiff also
stated that the school officials knew of the repeated abuse and
did nothing.16 5 In its analysis, the court employed the usual
arguments that parents and students were free to choose another
school and that parents were involved in the student's special

157 Id. at 702.
158 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200.
159 See generally Lewis, 308 F.3d at 775-76. The facts bring this case closer to the
facts of Youngberg, where a duty was found; however, the court focused its attention on
voluntary aspect of attending a school.
160 See Spivey v. Elliot, 29 F.3d 1522 (11th Cir. 1994) (discussing similar facts with
an opposite holding).
161 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992).
162 Id. at 1366.
163
164
165

Id.
Id.
Id.
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educational program;1 6 6 and consistent with DeShaney, the court
did not impose liability on the school officials, absent some
affirmative action on their behalf, despite their exercise of the
state's conferred in loco parentis authority. 167
In Pinder v. Johnson,168 a mother brought a § 1983 action
seeking to impose liability on a police officer who failed to
prevent the death of the plaintiffs three children.1 69 When the
plaintiffs ex-boyfriend was released from prison after serving a
sentence for arson, he came to her house. A scene of violent
abuse developed with the boyfriend threatening to murder the
plaintiff and her children. A neighbor helped the plaintiff to
subdue the boyfriend until police arrived and arrested him. The
plaintiff expressed her fears to the police, informed the officer of
the threats, said that her ex-boyfriend had threatened her and
the children before, and even attempted to burn them, for which
he received the arson conviction.1 70 The officer assured the
plaintiff that her ex-boyfriend would be under arrest for the
whole night and that her children would be safe when she went
to work that evening. The plaintiff did go to work, but the officer
only charged the perpetrator with trespass and destruction of
property, for which a commissioner released him with a warning
not to go near the plaintiffs house.171 Undeterred by the
warning, the perpetrator returned to the plaintiffs house and set
it on fire, which led to the children's death from smoke
inhalation. 172 In analyzing the plaintiffs claim, the court stayed
within DeShaney's reasoning, finding no state action173 and no
custody that would give rise to the duty.174 The Court overlooked
the officer's assurances to the plaintiff that it would be safe for
her to go to work and leave her children. Granted, civil liability
may seem too much of a punishment for an assertion in an
uncertain situation, the officer was acting under the color of law
and should be held to a higher duty with carefully designed
166 Id. at 1372.
167 Id. at 1373.

168 54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir. 1995).
169 Id. at 1171-72.

170 Id. at 1172.
171
172
173
174

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1175.
Id.
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immunities to shield from liability. Immunities should be based
on a reasonable professional judgment.
In Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock,1 7 5 the plaintiff, a mother of
three children, retained custody over them and obtained a
restraining order against their suicidal father.17 6 After the
restraining order was issued, the father abducted the three
children.
The mother notified the police immediately and
requested enforcement of the order. The police refused and told
her to wait for her ex-husband to return. Upon contacting her
ex-husband, the plaintiff learned of his whereabouts and again
asked the police to enforce the order. 7 7 She was told to wait for a
police officer, but no help arrived. In a couple of hours her
husband was killed after he opened fire near the police station.
The police discovered that earlier he had murdered his
children.17 8 Consistent with the DeShaney holding, the court
found no substantive due process violation in the officers' refusal
to enforce the restraining order and follow up on the lead
provided by the plaintiff,179 which would have possibly prevented
the deaths of three young children. These cases demonstrate
how permeating the DeShaney holding is, as well as how easy it
is for the courts to lose sight of "the first duty of government"1 0 :
the protection of its citizens.
TV. THE FUTURE
In light of the pervasiveness of the DeShaney doctrine and the
scope of its applicability, the future seems rather bleak for the
victims of governmental inaction. Since it does not appear likely
that the Court will overrule its holding, the only avenue of
protection may lie in a Congressional action, which is similar to
those taken to protect the rights of Black people. To intervene in
discrimination based on race, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. §
175 307 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2002).
176 Id.at 1261.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 1262.
179 Id. at 1263. Although there was no constitutional violation of due process, the
court found a violation of procedural due process based on a state statute. Id. at 1264. The
statute required officers to "use... reasonable means to enforce a restraining order" and
since the officers did not use reasonable means in enforcing restraining order, liability
was found. Id.
180 Heyman, supra note 139, at 507.

872

ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 18:3

1981,181 § 1982182 and § 1985,183 which ensure equal rights and

equal protection of the laws to all citizens, black and white.
These laws were aimed at the discriminatory conduct of private
181 Equal Rights Under the Law. 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
(a) Statement of equal rights. All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and
exactions of every kind, and to no other.
182 Property Rights of Citizens. 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property.
183 Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
(1) Preventing officer from performing duties. If two or more persons in any State or
Territory conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from
accepting or holding any office, trust, or place of confidence under the United States,
or from discharging any duties thereof; or to induce by like means any officer of the
United States to leave any State, district or place, where his duties as an officer are
required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on account of his
lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge
thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in
the discharge of his official duties;
(2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror. If two or more persons in
any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or
witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from
testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such
party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or
testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit
juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account of
any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or
having been such juror; or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of
impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of
justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal
protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or
attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal
protection of the laws;
(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges. If two or more persons in any State or
Territory conspire, or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for
the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws, or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any
State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or
Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to
prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote,
from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the
election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice-President,
or as a member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or
property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in
this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in
furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person
or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of
the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the
recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or
more of the conspirators.
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individuals and were enacted under the Enabling Clause of the
Thirteenth Amendment.184 The enactment was triggered by the
recognition that Blacks were members of the vulnerable class
and the usual methods of securing protection were not enough. 8 5
The statutes enacted under the Thirteenth Amendment were
initially aimed at equating racially diverse groups. However,
their remedial purpose - recognition of a vulnerable class - can be

transposed to the areas where certain categories of people may be
in need of that extra assurance of this protection. The Fourteenth
Amendment contains a similar Clause, 8 6 allowing it to enforce
the Amendment's provisions against the states.18 7 If Congress
can regulate conduct of the private individuals, it should be able
to proscribe egregious conduct by the states.
In contemporary America, children are certainly a vulnerable
class deserving and requiring the highest level of protection.18S
In light of the DeShaney holding, it would be quite appropriate
for Congress to take action and enact legislation geared toward
the protection of the generations destined to lead this country
into the future. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 purports to shield individuals
from deprivation of their rights by the state, but by judicial
interpretation, it has not done so in DeShaney and subsequent
cases. Perhaps a more effective approach would be to provide
incentives for the states to take the responsibility to protect their
184 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 Power to enforce the amendment.
185 See Amar, supra note 117, at 1359 (commenting on the 'peculiar institution' of
southern chattel slavery, with its auction blocks and iron chains, and stating that said
amendment's sweeping vision prohibited forced labor and still applies today); Adrieene D.
Davis, The Case for U.S. Reparations to African Americans, 7 HUM. RTS. BR. 3, 3-4 (2000)
(discussing political assaults and human rights deprivations that enslaved people
suffered, including denial of suffrage, denial of literacy, denial of serving on juries, and
denial of being able to testify against whites); David P. Tedhams, The Reincarnationof
"Jim Crow:" A Thirteenth Amendment Analysis of Colorado'sAmendment 2, 4 TEMP. POL.
& Civ. RTS. L. REV. 133, 137 (1994) (announcing that amendment XIII's framers wanted
to ban slavery as legally enforceable personal servitude, as well as denial of rights and
opportunities to newly free slaves).
186 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
187 Id.
188 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) "It is a sad commentary
upon American life, and constitutional principles-so full of late of patriotic fervor and
proud proclamations about "liberty and justice for all"-that this child, Joshua DeShaney,
now is assigned to live out the remainder of his life profoundly retarded." Aileen M.
Bigelow, Comment, In the Ghetto: The State's Duty to Protect Inner-City Children from
Violence, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 533, 560 (1993) (quoting from SYLVIA
ANN HEWLETT, WHEN THE BOUGH BREAKS, "the ultimate test of a moral society is the
kind of world it leaves to its children.").
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citizens by providing them with conditional aid. These conditions
could be the existence or creation of educational and counseling
services for families, intervention, and prevention programs. To
do that, the state's duty of care and protection has to be
reinserted into the core of public policy. If the legislature, both
federal and state, crafts "public policy and statutes that build in
a state duty of care, courts will be forced to confront issues" 18 9 of
state accountability.

CONCLUSION

The Constitution guarantees our liberties and the purpose and
obligation of the states is to protect these liberties. In a situation
of a governmental failure to carry out its obligation, the courts
have a unique power to secure the Constitutional guarantees and
require the states to protect them. As Alexis de Tocqueville
declared:
The strength of the Courts of law has always been the
greatest security that can be offered to personal
independence; but this is more especially in democratic ages.
Private rights and interests are in constant danger if the
judicial power does not grow more extensive and stronger to
keep pace with equality of conditions. 19 0

189 Miccio, supra note 115, at 168.
190 STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V. THE CONSTITUTION (1986) (quoting from
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA).

